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FROM THE STATES UP: BUILDING A
NATIONAL RENEWABLE
ENERGY POLICY
SHELLEY WELTON*
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report concluded that “[r]educing the nation’s dependence on oil
and carbon dioxide emissions in the next 25 years is not unlike the
1960s challenge to put a man on the moon.”1 In fact, this analogy
may be understated. While the scope of the two challenges is
similarly daunting, the consequences of failure are potentially
much more serious in the case of the energy challenge. One key
component of addressing this challenge will be changing the ways
in which the U.S. meets its seemingly insatiable electricity
demand. The environmental, foreign policy, health, and national
security costs of relying on fossil fuels to generate our nation’s
electricity are enormous. Not only are power plants responsible for
approximately 40 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, they
are also a major source of nitrous oxide, mercury, and sulfur
dioxide emissions. Consequently, our high usage of power plants
as a source of energy further entrenches our reliance upon fossil
fuel sources located in some of the world’s most geopolitically
unstable regions.2
* J.D. candidate, 2009, New York University School of Law; M.P.A.,
Columbia University; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would
like to thank Professors Richard Stewart, David Schoenbrod, and Katrina
Wyman for the opportunity to participate in the Breaking the Logjam Project,
and particularly Professor Stewart for his guidance in the writing of this article.
Thanks also to Michael Dowdy for his superb editing and constant support.
1
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEP’T OF ENERGY: KEY CHALLENGES
REMAIN FOR DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES,
GAO-07-106, at 53 (2006).
2
Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 20:4 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 43–44 (2007); see also Matt Bivens,
Fighting for America’s Energy Independence, 23 J. OF PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 471,
474 (2002). See generally TONY DUTZIK ET AL., REAPING THE REWARDS: HOW
987
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In contrast, renewable energy has the potential to play a
pivotal role in addressing our nation’s energy challenge by
providing a clean, domestic substitute for foreign, polluting fossil
fuels. In concert with energy efficiency policies to reduce United
States’s energy demand, an increase in the use of renewable
energy will be one critical component of altering the country’s
energy mix and addressing climate change. But some thirty years
after the U.S. first began promoting renewable energy, we have a
woefully underdeveloped national strategy.3 Many states have
stepped in to fill this national void by adopting their own
renewable energy strategies. Most significantly, twenty-five states
and the District of Columbia have adopted Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS) that mandate that utilities purchase a certain
percentage or amount of their power from renewable sources.
However, it seems unlikely that such policies can keep pace with
national energy demand so as to significantly change the national
energy mix. Whereas some have argued that states should continue
their “race to the top” as the primary policy engine for renewable
energy growth,4 this paper argues the opposite: the federal
government is uniquely positioned to bring about a large-scale
change in our electricity supply efficiently and effectively, and
should do so by adopting a national RPS.
Part I of this paper outlines why we should regulate renewable
energy, current policies and their effectiveness, and why an RPS is
the U.S.’s most promising future policy option. Part II discusses
federalism and renewable energy, identifying key reasons that the
federal government should be at the forefront of renewable energy
policy through adoption of a national RPS. Part III suggests a
strategy for moving forward on a national RPS and discusses the
interactions of renewable energy and climate change policy.

STATE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARDS ARE CUTTING POLLUTION, SAVING
MONEY, CREATING JOBS AND FUELING A CLEAN ENERGY BOOM (U.S. PIRG
Education Fund 2007).
3
See Sanya Carleyolsen, Tangled in the Wires: An Assessment of the
Existing U.S. Renewable Energy Legal Framework, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 759,
791 (2006) (“The dearth of strict, mandatory enforcement measures for
renewable energy deployment is difficult to overlook.”).
4
See, e.g., Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got it Right: There’s No Need to
Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451, 451(2006).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Renewable Energy Merits Government Promotion
Most basically, renewable energy is electricity generated from
sources that are inexhaustible or quickly replenish themselves. The
five most common types of renewable energy are biomass,
hydropower, geothermal, wind, and solar energy.5 A particular
renewable energy policy may also support more controversial
sources—for example, Pennsylvania’s RPS includes clean coal and
Maryland’s RPS includes poultry litter incineration.6 However, the
decision to be more inclusive often draws criticism for promoting
sources that are less than truly renewable or less sustainable than
other options.7 Less controversially, energy efficiency can also be
included in an RPS, thereby crediting reductions in demand
alongside shifts in supply.8
Renewable energy’s benefits are myriad. Most importantly, it
largely eliminates the air emissions caused by conventional
electricity sources. Moreover, by acting as a substitute to coal and
natural gas, renewable energy provides a more reliably priced
electricity source and helps mitigate spikes in price volatility of
conventional sources and reduce the national security costs
associated with our current fossil fuel supply.9 Finally, renewable
5

See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND
ELECTRICITY PRELIMINARY 2006 STATISTICS (2007), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/prelim_trends/pretrends.pdf.
6

See Mary Ann Ralls, supra note 4, at 468; BARRY G. RABE, RACE TO THE
TOP: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
18 (PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 2006).
7
See, e.g., Nogee et al., supra note 2, at 45. Of course, there are critics even
of the resources that are traditionally considered renewable—for example, wind
energy has experienced many siting challenges due to worries over harm to birds
and its impacts on sightlines. See Peter A. Groothuis et al., Green vs. Green:
Measuring the Compensation Required to Site Electrical Generation Windmills
in a Viewshed, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 1545, 1545 (2008).
8
Marilyn A. Brown et al., Reduced Emissions and Lower Costs: Combining
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency into a Sustainable Energy Portfolio
Standard, 20:4 ELECTRICITY J. 62, 64–65 (2007). However, a standardized and
reliable measure of energy efficiency would be a critical prerequisite to its
inclusion. See Kanako Tanaka, Assessment of Energy Efficiency Performance
Measures in Industry and Their Application for Policy, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 2887,
2887 (2008).
9
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Green Means ‘Go?’—A
Colorful Approach to a U.S. Renewable Portfolio Standard, 19:7 ELECTRICITY J.
19, 27 (2006); Nogee et al., supra note 2, at 43, 45.
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energy can act as an engine for economic growth—as a labor
intensive industry, it generates nearly twice as many jobs as fossil
fuel electricity generation and keeps more cash in local, often
rural, economies by cutting expenditures on foreign fuel inputs.10
These benefits, coupled with the increasingly unacceptable costs of
fossil fuel electricity generation, make renewable energy an even
more appealing and important component of changing the
country’s energy mix. However, these benefits are undervalued by
an electricity market that does not reflect the true worth of
renewables in its prices, making government promotion of
renewables critical to level the playing field.11 The policy options
currently being used, and those that could form the basis of a more
robust future renewables’ strategy, are the focus of the next two
subsections.

10

Nogee et al., supra note 2, at 42–43.
Other than large hydropower, wind is the only renewable technology that
currently has the potential, in ideal conditions, to compete cost-wise with
traditional power sources. Wind’s costs have fallen recently to under five cents
per kilowatt-hour (kWh), which is comparable with the cost of new coal and
natural gas generation facilities. See AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND
ENERGY COSTS, http://www.awea.org/faq/cost.html (last visited June 14, 2008).
However, this cost includes the federal production tax credit of 1.9 cents/kWh
that wind will receive at least through the end of 2008. Id. Thus, unsubsidized
wind is still not competitive with (subsidized) fossil fuel generation. Solar is still
considerably more expensive: recent estimates of the cost of residential solar are
around 37 cents/kWh hour, though industrial solar is less expensive due to larger
scale, as low as 21.3 cents/kWh. See SOLARBUZZ, SOLAR ELECTRICITY PRICES,
http://www.solarbuzz.com/SolarPrices.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
Electricity produced from wood biomass is nearing competitiveness, with costs
as low as 6 cents/kWh. See David Pimental, Weighing in on Renewable Energy
Efficiency, GEOTIMES, (2005), http://www.geotimes.org/aug05/feature_pimental.
html.
A number of market failures contribute to renewable energy’s difficulties in
competing with fossil fuels: the large historical and continuing subsidization of
conventional energy sources; relatively low levels of research and development
(R&D) investment in renewable energies over the last few decades; negative
externalities of fossil fuel generation that are not included in the costs that
consumers pay; national security costs of maintaining a steady supply of fossil
fuels from politically volatile regions of the world; and the relative immaturity of
renewable energy technologies, whose costs should fall as more experience is
gained and economies of scale are reached. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER
KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 70 (2001); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 1, at 2–3; Bivens, supra note 2, at 474; Nogee et al., supra note 2, at 38.
11
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B. Current Policies Are Inadequate to Change
the Energy Supply Mix
Though the federal government, beginning in the 1970s, took
aggressive early action to promote renewables, more recently
state-level policies have begun to dwarf federal efforts. The federal
government’s current renewable energy policies include an
accelerated five-year depreciation schedule for renewable energy
generators (the only major remaining driver from the 1978 Public
Utilities Regulatory Act, the original federal catalyst for renewable
energy);12 the production tax credit (PTC), which gives qualifying
renewable energy generators a tax credit of 2.0 cents/kWh of
renewable energy generated during its first ten years of
operation;13 a Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI),
analogous to the PTC, that gives cash production incentives to
publicly owned utilities and cooperatives that are unable to take
advantage of tax incentives;14 and more recently, Clean Renewable
Energy Bonds (CREBs), which are interest-free bonds that
electricity cooperatives and municipalities can use to finance
renewable energy projects.15 However, the PTC, REPI, and
CREBs have been heavily criticized for their temporary nature—
they depend upon short-term legislative extensions and
Congressional appropriations such that they cannot be relied upon
in long-term renewable project financing.16 The federal
government also continues its more traditional role in energy
research and development, though funding for such research
shrunk by 85 percent in real terms between 1978 and 2005.17
Overall, the effect of these federal policies is relatively meager—
the GAO has critiqued the federal government’s renewable energy
12

See Fredric C. Menz, Green Electricity Policies in the United States: Case
Study, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2398, 2402 (2005); Lori Bird et al., Policies and Market
Factors Driving Wind Power Development in the United States, 33 ENERGY
POL’Y 1397, 1399 (2005); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006).
13
See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2000); Bird et al., supra note 12, at 1398; Carleyolsen,
supra note 3, at 771; AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT
EXTENSION, http://www.awea.org/legislative/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
14
Bird et al., supra note 12, at 1398–99.
15
NEW ENGLAND ROUNDTABLE ON FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY,
GROWING RENEWABLE ENERGY: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NEW ENGLAND 12
(2005).
16
See id. at 12; Bird et al., supra note 12, at 1399; Carleyolsen, supra note 3,
at 771; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 3.
17
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 5.
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policies as “unlikely. . . .[to] be sufficient to deploy alternative
energy sources in the next 25 years that will reverse our growing
dependence on imported oil or the adverse environmental effects
of using conventional fossil energy.”18
Fortunately, states have stepped in to fill the federal void in
renewable energy policy. By far the most effective state strategy is
a mandatory renewable energy purchase requirement, which
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted
through RPS.19 An RPS requires electricity suppliers to ensure that
a certain percentage or a certain absolute amount of the electricity
they are supplying to consumers comes from renewable energy
sources.20 However, though all states have chosen the same basic
policy mechanism, RPS design details vary substantially by state
and, as a result of these variations, state experiences are mixed in
terms of actual impacts on renewable energy generation.21 While
this paper will not explore the nuances of state RPS designs in
detail, it is helpful to note that designs vary in such basic elements
as the type of renewable resources that are eligible, the stringency
of targets (ranging from 2–30% and varying by the year in which
they are imposed), the way in which targets and compliance are
measured and verified, the rules regarding whether or not credits
can be carried over from year to year, and the penalties for noncompliance.22 One noteworthy feature of most state RPS is that
they measure utilities’ compliance with their obligations through
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs), which are awarded to
renewable energy producers on the basis of the number of kWh or
18

Id. at 53.
See Bird et al., supra note 12, at 1400; N.C. SOLAR CTR., RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2008), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/library/
includes/topic.cfm?TopicCategoryID=6&CurrentPageID=10&EE=1&RE=1
(follow link for “Renewables Portfolio Standards”). The states with RPS are
WA, OR, NV, CA, AZ, NM, HI, TX, MT, CO, IA, IL, WI, MN, NC, ME, NH,
MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, PA, MD, DE, and DC.
20
Ryan Wiser et al., Renewable Portfolio Standards: A Factual Introduction
to Experience from the United States 3 (LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.
2007). For example, California is requiring 20 percent of its electricity to come
from renewable sources by 2010; Texas is requiring 5880 MW by 2015. See
N.C. SOLAR CTR., supra note 19.
21
Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 4.
22
See, e.g., id. at 4–6; Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable
Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Rules, 20:4 ELECTRICITY
J. 21, 26–31 (2007); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Big Is
Beautiful: The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio
Standard, 20:4 ELECTRICITY J. 48, 50–51 (2007).
19
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MWh of renewable energy produced and that recipients can trade
or sell to provide a separate income stream from the actual
electricity produced and sold.23 However, each state’s RECs are
different, which means that RECs cannot currently be traded from
state to state, though some regional trading networks are currently
being developed.24
Overall, state RPS and other state-level financial incentives,
information-based strategies, and regulations represent a clear
statement that states will not stand by while the federal
government leads the country to an unsustainable energy future.
Nevertheless, even with these laudable policies in place at the state
level, the prognosis for renewable energy’s ability to meet a
significant portion of future projected U.S. electricity demand is
disappointing. The mix of energy used in the U.S. has changed
very little since the country first became interested in renewable
energy in the 1970s, and our reliance on fossil fuel sources will be
further entrenched rather than lessened in the next twenty years
absent a major policy change.25 In its 2007 Renewable Energy
Outlook, the Energy Information Administration projected that the
percentage of U.S. electricity generation supplied by nonhydropower renewable energy will increase from 2.3 percent in
2006 to 3.6 percent in 2030—a very modest improvement over
twenty-five years.26 Even if all state RPS policies currently in
place were to be fully implemented, the amount of renewable
energy generation predicted by 2030 would be only 4.6 percent of
national energy generation—certainly an improvement, but not
significant enough to change the country’s energy supply mix so as
to address climate change and the myriad other problems of fossil
fuel electricity generation.27 These numbers suggest that major
23

Cory & Swezey, supra note 22, at 22; see Christopher B. Berendt, A StateBased Approach to Building a Liquid National Market for Renewable Energy
Certificates: The REC-EX Model, 19:5 ELECTRICITY J. 54, 55 (2006). RECs are
important in helping to reduce the costs of complying with an RPS policy—
utilities are simply required to have enough RECs to cover their percentage
obligation each year, and do not have to directly purchase or generate all of the
renewable energy needed to meet their obligation. Cory & Swezey, supra note
22, at 22.
24
See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 9, at 24.
25
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 1.
26
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007 86 (2007). For
reference, a MWh is the equivalent of powering approximately 750 households
for one hour. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2.
27
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 26, at 87.
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policy innovations will be necessary if the U.S. is genuine about its
desire to shift from fossil fuel energy sources to renewable energy
sources and to reap the attendant benefits.
C. Policy Options: An RPS Presents the Best Model for the U.S.
An RPS is not the only policy design option for promoting
renewables. Voluntary green purchase programs, tax incentives,
informational strategies, and production credits like the PTC are all
policy options, but these are unlikely to create enough demand to
drive up dramatically the supply of renewable energy on their
own.28 More robust policy options include a carbon dioxide capand-trade system and the European model of a feed-in tariff. This
subsection compares these two options to an RPS to suggest that
the best option for an aggressive U.S. renewables policy is an RPS
coupled with a federal carbon cap-and-trade policy.29
A federal cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide seems
likely to be adopted in the next several years,30 and several
regional cap-and-trade models are being implemented in the
interim.31 While these programs will benefit renewables, they
should work in concert with an RPS rather than as a replacement.
Renewables form a critical component of most climate change
strategies because absent completely eliminating electricity
demand, new sources of energy to replace highly polluting fossil
fuel power plants are essential. While a cap-and-trade system on
28
See Kevin L. Doran, Can the U.S. Achieve A Sustainable Energy Economy
from the Bottom-Up? An Assessment of State Sustainable Energy Initiatives, 7
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 95, 116 (2005).
29
The interaction between an RPS policy and a federal cap-and-trade
program for carbon dioxide are discussed more thoroughly infra, Part III.
30
The vast majority of recent Congressional proposals for climate change
legislation are cap-and-trade policies. See, e.g., America’s Climate Security Act
of 2007, S.2191, 110th Cong. (2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R.
620, 110th Cong, (2007); Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317,
110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007).
31
For example, the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative will
auction its first allowances in September 2008 and go into effect in January,
2009. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, DESIGN ELEMENTS
FOR REGIONAL ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS UNDER THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE
INITIATIVE
(2008),
available
at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/
GAS
20080317auction_design.pdf; REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, STATES
CONDUCT FIRST-IN-THE-NATION AUCTION OF CARBON DIOXIDE ALLOWANCES 1–
2 (2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_press_9_25_2008.pdf
(explaining that all participating states will have implementing legislation in
place by Jan. 1, 2009 so as to have the program begin running in 2009).
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its own would help to promote more renewable energy by raising
the price of conventional energy, it would not necessarily promote
an optimum level of renewable energy because it would not
capture, in its pricing of carbon dioxide, the additional benefits of
renewable energy including lessened dependence on foreign fossil
fuel supplies, heightened national security, overall cleaner air, and
local and rural job creation.32 Thus, an RPS represents renewable
energy as a particularly viable and vital alternative to fossil fuel
energy generation, not simply as an equal to all other carbon-free
energy sources. Moreover, an RPS policy that accelerates the
development of renewables and drives down their costs will be
critical in lowering the compliance costs of a cap-and-trade
policy—“[t]he availability of advanced, low-carbon technologies
is crucial to minimizing the cost of achieving GHG reductions.”33
A separate alternative to an RPS is a feed-in tariff, a policy
used by many European countries (though many others use RPStype policies).34 Whereas RPS policies set an overall quota and
allow the market to determine the price, feed-in tariffs set a
guaranteed price that utilities must pay for any renewable energy
offered into the grid, and thus leave the amount of supply up to the
market.35 There is considerable debate in Europe over which
policy is more effective.36 While a feed-in tariff gives renewable
energy producers investment confidence by setting a guaranteed
price, it leaves unknown the ultimate amount of renewable energy
that will be produced.37 Moreover, it may not create large
incentives for innovation and cost-effectiveness, because
producers do not have to compete with each other to produce
renewables at the lowest cost.38 The choice of an RPS model,
while offering less investor certainty as to future prices, offers
distinct cost advantages by requiring renewable energy producers
32

See Stine Grenaa Jensen & Klaus Skytte, Simultaneous Attainment of
Energy Goals by Means of Green Certificates and Emission Permits, 31 ENERGY
POL’Y 63, 64 (2003).
33
PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INSIGHTS FROM MODELING
ANALYSES OF THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY ACT 2 (2008).
34
See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the
European Union: The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 3 (2006).
35
Id. at 6.
36
Id. at 7, 12.
37
Id. at 7–8.
38
Id.
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to compete to sell certificates at lowest cost in the RECs market,
and also ensures a guaranteed demand for renewable energy.39 The
cost-effectiveness of an RPS policy, when compared to a feed-in
tariff, makes it particularly attractive as a national model in the
U.S. where there would otherwise be the potential for major cost
differentials among regions and states.
In any case, the U.S. seems to have escaped the dichotomous
policy development occurring in Europe, with all U.S. states that
have adopted major renewables legislation opting for an RPS.40
This “path dependence,” whereby states have chosen to adopt (and
often adapt) the same model chosen by earlier-acting states, may
be quite positive: the many states that have experimented with
differing RPS have amassed a good deal of knowledge on how
such a system is best designed and administered.41 The next
section of this paper argues that it is time to take the knowledge
gleaned from this state experimentation with RPS and apply it to
the creation of a national RPS.
II. THE U.S. NEEDS A NATIONAL RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARD
On December 7, 2007, the U.S. Senate rejected a cloture
motion 53-42 that would have brought a federal RPS to a full vote,
as part of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.42
The Senate’s rejection of an RPS in this bill marked the eighteenth
time in the last ten years that federal legislation to establish a
national RPS has failed, largely based on the justification that a
national RPS would be fundamentally unfair to those states that are
less well endowed with renewable energy resources.43 But this
39

Id. at 8–9.
See, e.g., Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 58 (discussing features of
U.S. states’ renewables policies); see also N.C. SOLAR CTR., supra note 19
(illustrating the states that have adopted RPS); Doran, supra note 28, at 107
(noting that RPS have been hailed as the most popular and successful measure
that states are taking with respect to renewable energy).
41
See, e.g., id. at 55–58; Doran, supra note 28, at 116; Brown, York, &
Kushler, supra note 8, at 62; RABE, supra note 6, at 24 (“[S]tates are clearly
learning lessons from one another . . .”).
42
153 CONG. REC. S15,009 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2007).
43
See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 48–49; Anne C. Mulkern,
Renewable-Energy Standard Included in Capitol Hill Bill, DENVER POST, Dec. 4,
2007, at B1 (expressing Sen. Allard’s disagreement with a single national
standard although he supports Colorado’s RPS); 153 CONG. REC. H14,263 (daily
40
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critique of a national RPS is misguided and masks a central truth: a
federal RPS is the most efficient and effective way to build a
sustainable energy future in the U.S., and a well-designed policy
can minimize disproportionate impacts such that these impacts do
not act as a roadblock for an otherwise sound and important policy.
This section takes three key arguments that scholars generally
make in favor of federal regulation and applies them to the field of
renewable energy: public good attributes, ecologies of scale, and
economies of scale.44
A. Renewable Energy Is a National Public Good
One reason that the U.S. needs a national RPS rather than
scattered state RPS is that renewable energy is a public good—its
promotion by some states “provide[s] non-excludable benefits to
residents in other states” that make it likely to be under-provided
by any particular state.45 In the case of public goods, some states
become free riders that take no action themselves yet benefit from
action taken in other states.46 As discussed supra, renewable
energy’s myriad benefits include reduced national security and
military costs, lower and more stable national fossil fuel prices,
and reduced carbon dioxide and other pollution benefits. While
some of the economic benefits of renewable energy may be felt
locally, many of these benefits are national and international in
scope. Thus, while ratepayers in twenty-five states bear the costs
of supporting renewable energy through RPS policies, ratepayers
in twenty-five remaining states reap many of the benefits of
renewable energy while enjoying artificially low electricity prices
that actually increase their demand, contrary to the public good.47
While RPS states may enjoy some internal benefits of greater
renewable energy usage and may even be willing to advance
altruistically the goals of the country by promoting renewable
ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep. Sullivan).
44
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 132, 143 (2006). Though Adler argues
that the federalist structure of the U.S. government creates a presumption in
favor of state regulation, this presumption is rebuttable and “can be overcome in
any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for federal intervention.”
Id.
45
See id. at 143 (arguing that public goods present one situation where
federal policies may be necessary).
46
Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 49.
47
Id.
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energy on a scale that goes beyond internal benefits, ultimately no
state is going to be willing or able to bear the costs of nearly half
the states acting as laggards on renewable energy, to the detriment
of the national interest.
B. Ecologies of Scale: The Interstate Electricity System Creates
the Need for a National Response to Match
Energy Supply and Demand Across States
A second reason that a federal RPS is preferable is that the
scale of the U.S. electricity infrastructure and electricity industry
spans state bounds. The result of this interstate infrastructure is
that
individual
states
cannot
make
forward-looking,
comprehensive regulations that ensure an adequate match of
renewable energy supply and demand in the future. As Jonathan
Adler posits in his article Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, environmental problems should be
addressed through “ecologies of scale,” whereby environmental
problems are regulated by institutions that exist at the same scope
as the problem in question to create the most efficient regulation.48
In the case of electricity generation, the infrastructure that makes
up our national electricity supply and delivery system is decidedly
interstate: transmission lines cross state bounds, the wholesale
electricity market typically spans several states, and most utilities
hold generation capacity in more than one state. This interstate
scale raises several problems for state-level RPS.
One problem that our interstate transmission system creates
for state RPS is that it is physically at odds with current state-level
policies. Many states set geographic restrictions where renewable
energy that counts towards their targets can be generated, or limit
the interstate trade of RECs to meet renewable energy targets in
ways that might be unconstitutional.49 Though such restrictions are
logical for states that want to subsidize local renewable energy
producers, they risk running afoul of the dormant commerce clause
by discriminating against out of state renewable energy
producers.50 While no policies have yet been challenged in court,
48

Adler, supra note 44, at 133.
See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 53–54.
50
See id.; Steven Ferrey, Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable
Standards at the State Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 55–57. Texas and
Nevada may be particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenges—they each
confine acceptable imports of renewable electricity to those that arrive via a
49
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the possible unconstitutionality of these restrictions creates a risky
regulatory environment that threatens the stability of the renewable
energy market for investors and producers.51 In contrast, a single
federal market would alleviate legal uncertainties and provide a
match of regulatory scope in line with the interstate scale of
electricity transmission.
Moreover, there is currently a serious difficulty in the
interplay between interstate transmission and state RPS—the
supply of renewable energy cannot keep up with the demand
generated by state RPS because of a backlog in interconnection
requests at the regional level.52 This backlog means that even with
RPS policies generating accelerated demand for renewable energy,
there may not be enough supply available to meet this growing
demand absent higher-level solutions to expedite the supply and
interconnection of renewables to the grid.53
These problems of scale present another reason that
renewable energy promotion might function better at the national
level. A federal RPS, coupled with current federal jurisdiction over
access to transmission lines, would provide a “logical nexus”
between supply and demand of renewable energy.54 With an
overarching federal RPS in place, there would be a more stable,
predictable level of renewable energy demand that would occur at
the same level of government as the planning of long-term
renewable energy supply and interconnections.
C. Economies of Scale: We Could Reap Major
Efficiency Gains from a National RPS
Economies of scale provide the final critical justification for a
national RPS—federal government regulation often creates
efficiency by having a single federal standard that replaces a
“multiplicity of state standards,” thereby lowering compliance

dedicated transmission line. RABE, supra note 6, at 25.
51
Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 53–54.
52
See State RPS Policies Creating Log Jam in Interconnection Requests,
ENERGY WASHINGTON WEEK, Dec. 19, 2007.
53
BLAIR SWEEZEY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., A PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND BALANCE FOR RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY 8 (2007), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/
42266.pdf.
54
See Kelly Backs Kelliher on Enforcement, Pushes Clean Energy
Transmission Up Priority List, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Dec. 3, 2007.
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costs.55 While a national RPS would not necessarily pre-empt
states from setting more stringent state-level targets or including
additional renewable energy sources, it would eliminate the
proliferation of state RECs markets and merge these into a single
national trading market that would facilitate least-cost compliance
with the federal RPS.56 Currently, state RPS are accompanied by
their own RECs markets that vary in price, eligible resources,
market rules, and size such that there is no fungibility among the
RECs of different states.57 In contrast, the creation of a national
RECs market would decrease compliance costs in states that
already have RPS, and would allow states that have not yet
adopted an RPS, often due to a claimed lack of renewable
resources, to meet a federal RPS as cost-effectively as possible.
If a national trading market for RECs were created, a national
price for renewable energy support would emerge and renewable
generation would be built in whichever area of the country had the
most cost-effective resources.58 This would lead to efficiency gains
in the RECs markets and relieve the concerns of resource-poor
states that they will face enormously high relative compliance
costs—when utilities buy RECs from a single national market, all
states should face leveled compliance costs.59 Moreover, a
national market would create a more certain, stable exchange by
standardizing definitions of renewable energy, harmonizing
accounting principles for issuing and tracking RECs, and amassing
a large enough market to prevent severe price fluctuations.60
Finally, with renewable energy production happening on a larger
national scale, we can expect its costs and prices to drop more
quickly, as large-scale investment and economies of scale in
production can help boost technological innovations that will make
55

See Adler, supra note 44, at 145, 148. Some commentators suggest that a
federal standard actually should pre-empt state standards in the interest of
uniformity. See, e.g., Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 55.
56
See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 22, at 57–58.
57
Cory & Swezey, supra note 22, at 22; Berendt, supra note 23, at 57.
58
See Pallab Mozumder & Achla Marathe, Gains from an Integrated Market
for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259, 264 (2004).
Currently, the subsidy that is provided to renewable energy producers by the sale
of RECs varies considerably—for example, a 2004 study found that California
RECs provided renewables producers a price premium of 1.6 cents/kWh, while
New York RECs provided a price premium of 4 cents/kWh. Id. at 265.
59
See id. at 263.
60
Nogree et al., supra note 2, at 35. See Berendt, supra note 23, at 55, 57;
Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 11.
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renewables more competitive with traditional energy sources.61
III. IT IS TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON A NATIONAL RPS
[F]or too long, the pursuit of a ‘silver bullet’ national renewable
energy strategy, embraced by all and burdensome to none, has
kept the capacity of renewable energy ludicrously below its
potential. The debate over a national RPS remains contentious
even though many of the issues have been resolved by
empirical data or can be avoided by structuring the program in a
smart way.62

Given the enormous national challenge of moving towards a
cleaner and more secure energy future, a more comprehensive
national renewable energy strategy is vital. As more state-level
RPS are adopted, issues of inter-state collaboration and the need
for more coordinated action become more and more apparent: “one
of the strongest cases against ‘bottom-up’ policy design in a
federal system involves those situations in which multiple states
fail to work cooperatively and instead establish a patchwork quilt
of provisions that precludes interstate cooperation.”63 Moreover, a
federal RPS policy is appealing for its clarity and predictability—it
avoids David Schoenbrod’s critique of federal environmental
policy that Congress typically passes off impossible mandates to
regulatory agencies.64 Instead, at least in the latest proposed RPS,
Congress set definitive targets and a clear timeline that utilities
must follow.65 A well-designed, clearly articulated RPS policy
creates a national market with economies of scale that allow for
promotion of renewable energy at the lowest overall cost to the
country, and at a magnitude appropriate for the scope of the
national problem.66
There are some questions that still need answering with
regards to a federal RPS. One important issue is how a federal
61
See James McVeigh et al., Winner, Loser, or Innocent Victim? Has
Renewable Energy Performed as Expected?, 68 SOLAR ENERGY 237, 237 (2000).
62
Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 9, at 30.
63
RABE, supra note 6, at 24.
64
See DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON
8–9 (2005) (explaining Congress’s trend of passing general statutes that order
agencies to make specific rules, thus taking credit for addressing a problem while
shifting blame for the costs and the possibility of failure to the agency).
65
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. §
1401(a) (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by House).
66
Nogee et al., supra note 2, at 35.

WELTON MACRO.DOC

1002

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

11/21/2008 3:20:25 PM

[Volume 17

standard will interact with existing state standards—most states
with RPS favor a federal standard that does not pre-empt more
aggressive state standards, in which case the issues of dual
compliance with federal and state systems must be negotiated.67
Ultimately, though many states are opposed, the interest in
national uniformity and the simplicity of a single standard might
lead to a federal pre-emption provision, likely favored by utilities.
A second major challenge that must be overcome in
implementing a national RPS is how to ensure that resource-poor
states do not bear inequitable cost burdens.68 Renewable energy
comes from natural resource endowments that vary geographically
and unevenly across the U.S.: the central U.S. (Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) has the best
wind resources; California has 90 percent of the country’s
geothermal resources; and the southwest and the south Atlantic
coast have the best solar technology potential.69 Southern and coalheavy states have been instrumental in blocking national RPS
legislation because of worries that they stand to lose the most and
gain the least from such a policy.70 A national RPS may indeed
raise electricity costs for consumers across the nation, though price
increases are uncertain and projected to be minimal at worst.71 And
because of resource differences among regions, there are likely to
be substantial cost differentials to producing renewable electricity
in different places.72 However, a national RECs market should
work to equalize compliance costs across states, as utilities in
resource-poor regions will choose to buy RECs from suppliers in
67

See Wiser et al., supra note 20, at 14–15.
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H14,263 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Sullivan).
69
Menz, supra note 12, at 2400–01.
70
See, e.g., 153 Cong. Rec. S15,007 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2007) (statement of
Sen. McConnell).
71
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT
RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO
STANDARD
8
(2007),
available
at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/service/sroiaf(2007)03.pdf. The EIA estimated in
2007 that a fifteen-percent federal RPS by 2030 would raise cumulative
consumer expenditures on natural gas and electricity by 0.3 percent compared to
the reference case. Id. But see ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OIL AND
NATURAL GAS MARKET SUPPLY AND RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD
IMPACTS OF SELECTED PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3221 8 (2007) (projecting slightly
lower or unchanged cumulative residential energy expenditures under a 15
perecnt RPS proposed in the House of Representatives).
72
See Mozumder & Marathe, supra note 58, at 262.
68
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resource-rich areas.73 This raises a separate concern, though—
while a national RECs market may equalize compliance costs
across the country, this equalization will occur because renewable
generation will be built in the places it is cheapest. Thus, some
states will disproportionately reap the advantages of local, green
job creation and rural development. Resource poor states may feel
that they are, in effect, paying a subsidy to those states that enjoy
the most renewable generation development.74
There are, however, a few reasons that resource-poor states
should not be overly concerned: first, electricity costs should
become more equalized throughout the country due to Congress’s
recent repeal of the Public Utilities Company Holding Act
(PUCHA) that restricted utility companies to certain geographic
areas.75 Since this time, utilities have begun diversifying their
holdings throughout the U.S., lowering the impact that any one
state’s utilities will feel from a national RPS.76 Second, by
including energy efficiency as one of the eligible resources, the
most recent federal RPS proposal helps make the RPS more
equitable, as all states have low-cost energy efficiency
improvements available.77 Thus, if a federal RPS is ultimately
adopted with generous energy efficiency options, all states should
see positive local impacts in the form of new, green businesses in
the energy efficiency field.78
A third issue that will have to be broached, given the
likelihood that a national climate change strategy will be adopted
in the next few years, is the ways in which a concomitant national
climate change policy and an RPS would interact. An essential
overlap exists between RECs and carbon allowances, in that RECs
represent carbon reductions achieved from using renewable energy
rather than conventional energy, and carbon allowances represent
allowable emissions of carbon.79 This overlap raises the question
of whether a utility buying RECs, which represent kWhs of
73

See id. at 263–64.
Ralls, supra note 4, at 467.
75
Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 9, at 22.
76
Id.
77
Brown et al., supra note 8, at 64.
78
Id.
79
LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, IMPLICATIONS OF
CARBON REGULATION FOR GREEN POWER MARKETS 30 (2007), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/41076.pdf.
74
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renewably-produced electricity, must at the same time retire
enough emissions allowances to match the emissions reductions
achieved by this renewable energy.80 If a utility does not have to
retire emissions allowances to match its renewable energy
purchases, then the renewable energy it purchased will not
contribute to overall carbon dioxide reductions, as the utility can
then sell its excess allowances that it has from buying renewable
energy to other cap-and-trade participants.81 If a utility is required
to retire emissions allowances with its RECs, then RPS policies
will result in additional emissions reductions beyond what is
required under the cap-and-trade regime, but this will make
compliance more expensive.82 Essentially, a decision must be
made as to whether RECs are to represent a separate, additional
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions (in which case utilities
should be required to retire a corresponding number of emissions
allowances), or whether RECs should represent only those
additional benefits of renewable energy beyond carbon emissions
reductions (in which case utilities need not retire emissions
allowances). Alternately, renewables’ carbon reduction benefits
could be recognized through rewarding renewable energy
generators emissions allowances when the allowances are being
distributed, thus crediting the emissions benefits that they provide
under the cap-and-trade program.83 However the market overlap is
resolved, it is again apparent that a clear, uniform rule for how the
two markets are to interact will be essential, and that federal
administration of both markets would facilitate the regulation of
the overlaps between them.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the challenges surrounding a national RPS are
minor compared to the benefits that could be derived from
implementing such a coordinated national strategy for promoting
renewable energy. A national RPS would harness the most
80

Id. at 31.
Id.
82
Id.; see also Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, Cost-Effectiveness of
Renewable Electricity Policies, 27 ENERGY ECON. 873, 891 (2005).
83
Palmer & Burtra, supra note 82, at 891; see Elizabeth Lokey, Valuing
Renewable Energy in Emerging U.S. Carbon Markets, ELECTRICITY J., July
2007, at 47–55, for a longer discussion of the ways in which the allocation
method of carbon allowances might include and impact renewable energy.
81
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efficient resources available in every part of the country and level
compliance costs throughout the country with a national RECs
market. Given the scale of the energy and environmental problems
confronting the U.S. and the world, a more robust renewable
energy policy is a critical part of achieving a more sustainable
future energy supply and addressing climate change. While states
taking the lead in renewable energy and increasingly in climate
change policy is an important and meaningful first step, strong
federal action is necessary to coherently, efficiently, and
effectively address the pressing national and international
challenges of a more sustainable and stable energy future.

